



BN 2022/2062: 11 May 2022

## **FACTSHEET: International response to Ukraine situation highlights sluggishness on Burma/Myanmar**

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- Since 1 Feb 2021, international governments have dragged their feet in responding to the Burma crisis. The junta has been allowed to continue its destruction, and brutality against the people of Burma, supported by international revenue flows.
- During 1 Jan–22 Apr this year, there were 4,971 armed clashes and attacks on civilians in Ukraine. While this exceeded the 3,310 in Burma over the same period, the state of conflict in Burma has now gone on for 15 months and involved at least 10,962 clashes and attacks.
- In the face of Russian aggression and atrocities in Ukraine, the international community has used its tremendous power to dissuade Russia from continuing. However, despite recognizing the urgency of protecting civilians, the international community has not gone nearly far enough in responding to the Burma crisis.
- The international community's response to the invasion of Ukraine is stunning evidence of what is possible given sufficient political will. The failure of the international community—particularly powerful governments of the global north—to ramp up actions to halt the junta will hurt tens of millions of people and strengthen accusations of double standards in civilian protection. In order to stop suffering and restore democracy in Burma:
  - The US, EU, and others must act to effectively halt the flow of foreign exchange revenue to the illegal junta, to reduce its ability to attack civilians; the junta remains unrecognized as the government and is therefore not entitled to these revenues. This includes sanctioning Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB), and Myanmar Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB) to prevent the junta from using export profits to arm itself for its crackdown on the people of Burma. There must also be a global arms embargo.
  - The US, EU, and others must comprehensively address the humanitarian crisis resulting from the junta's violence, blocking of humanitarian aid, and gross economic mismanagement. As a first step, work needs to begin immediately to ensure aid is delivered to communities based along the country's western and eastern borders, which have been disproportionately affected.
  - The US, EU, and others must take the necessary steps to ensure that the perpetrators of atrocity crimes in Burma are held accountable, including by referring the junta's actions to the ICC and backing the National Unity Government (NUG) declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the court.

On 24 Feb 2022, the world watched in horror as Russian forces invaded Ukraine from three sides, extending the scope of its 2014 aggression in the country's southeastern region. While Russia's allies—notably China—largely stayed silent, much of the Western world reacted swiftly, enacting crippling sanctions against Russia, going out of their way to help the populations affected by conflict, and deploying efforts to ensure that Russian troops are held accountable for the atrocities they commit there.

On 1 Feb 2021, the world watched in horror as the Burma military surrounded the country's capital, Naypyidaw, and detained elected parliamentarians, recapitulating coups that had deprived Burma's population of human rights for decades until 2011. For the people of Burma, this was only the beginning of the terror; for over 15 months now, the junta has consistently ramped up the frequency and brutality

of attacks against civilians, enacted draconian “laws,” and crushed the economy, pushing millions into starvation. For much of the Western world, concern lasted the length of a news cycle—foreign governments placed not nearly enough importance on addressing the situation, and foreign populations gave little attention to a faraway conflict.

**Economic sanctions: half-measures will not stop the junta**

| Measure type              | Ukraine situation  | Burma situation  |
|---------------------------|--|--|
| <b>Economic sanctions</b> | <p>The US, UK, EU, Switzerland, Norway, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore each do at least several of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-freezing assets of Russian and Belarusian banks, and removing these banks from the SWIFT international payment system</li> <li>-sanctioning/preventing transactions with Russian banks, including the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, Russia’s Ministry of Finance and sovereign wealth funds, and Belarusian banks, including the Central Bank of Belarus</li> <li>-restricting imports from and exports to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, which Russia has attempted to seize</li> <li>-banning new Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Russia, and prohibiting the provision of credit-rating services to Russian firms</li> <li>-banning imports of Russian oil and gas, as well as other products</li> <li>-banning exports of goods and technologies that would benefit Russia’s energy sector; and banning of exports of luxury goods to Russia and/or Belarus</li> <li>-banning Russian airlines from flying in their airspace</li> <li>-prohibiting the issuance of securities to Russia and its banks, and limiting transactions that affect Russia’s sovereign debt</li> </ul> <p>The UK revoked the Moscow Stock Exchange’s status as a recognized exchange, and suspended publicly-funded research with Russian universities and companies.</p> <p>The US, EU, UK, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan increased import tariffs to eliminate World Trade Organization (WTO) membership benefits, and denied Russia’s borrowing privileges at the World Bank and IMF.</p> | <p>The US, UK, EU, and Canada have imposed sanctions on businesses owned or operated by military members and those connected to them (“crony companies”) as well as some of Myanmar’s state owned enterprises.</p> <p>The EU has sanctioned the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise, albeit with exemptions that negate the very purpose of the sanctions.</p> <p>The US has frozen reserves of the Central Bank of Myanmar in the New York Federal Reserve Bank.</p> |
| <b>Military sanctions</b> | <p>Foreign governments have restricted the export of dual-use technologies, semiconductors, telecoms and information security technology, lasers, sensors, navigation equipment, (micro)electronics, aircraft components, and anything to the military of Russia and Belarus.</p>  | <p>The US, UK, EU, and Canada have imposed sanctions on the Burma military, individual units, and upper members.</p> <p>These and other nations have banned the export of military and dual-use technology to the military.</p>  |

PIIE (updated 29 Apr 2022) Russia's war on Ukraine: A sanctions timeline; ALTSEAN-Burma (1 Feb 2022) Burma/Myanmar: sanctions piling up but not yet good enough; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea (13 Mar 2021) Korean Government's Measures on Situation in Myanmar

The Russian invasion of Ukraine was met with **a wide range of sanctions targeting Russia’s main source of revenue**, its lucrative energy sector. On 26 Feb, the US, EU, UK, and Canada **removed major Russian banks from the SWIFT global payments system** to delay payments to Russia for energy exports. They also imposed measures to prevent the Russian Central Bank from undermining

sanctions by deploying its USD 630 billion worth of foreign reserves.<sup>1</sup> On 8 Mar, the **US banned imports of Russian oil, liquefied natural gas, and coal**. On 9 Mar, the UK announced that it would phase out imports of Russian oil by the end of 2022. The same day, Japan banned exports on oil refining equipment to Russia. On 10 Mar, Australia banned imports of oil, coal, and other oil-based products from Russia.<sup>2</sup> The EU committed to reducing gas imports by two-thirds within a year,<sup>3</sup> and is working on phasing out oil imports.<sup>4</sup>

In stark contrast, the junta's two main sources of foreign exchange have remained largely untouched, allowing it to fund its all-out war against the people of Burma. For decades, the military has used **state-owned enterprises (SOEs)** to control and cash in on Burma's natural resources. SOEs have been used to exploit and export gems, jade, timber, and gas, with payments in foreign currencies being processed by the state-owned **Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB)** and **Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB)**. Although the US, EU, and UK sanctioned the **Myanma Gems Enterprise (MGE)** and the **Myanma Timber Enterprise (MTE)**, the junta still made millions of dollars by organizing three gem fairs in Naypyidaw.<sup>5</sup> In addition, supply chain complexities allowed some timber and gems exports to continue, including to US and EU companies,<sup>6</sup> highlighting the need for more proactive measures to enforce existing sanctions.

**Revenue flows for gas projects collected by the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) have escaped major disruptions.** MOGE is expected to earn USD 1.5 billion from foreign oil and gas companies in 2021–2022. Around 50% of Burma's foreign currency usually comes from such payments, with the Yadana gas field (operated by French firm TotalEnergies) earning around USD 400 million in 2017–2018.<sup>7</sup> Pressured by France, the EU waited until TotalEnergies' announcement that it would leave Burma within six months to sanction MOGE, on 21 Feb 2022. Yet, ambiguous provisions could allow the Total to transfer some of its shares to MOGE upon its exit on 20 Jul 2022;<sup>8</sup> and six-months' worth of payments to the regime, estimated at USD 250 million, went undisrupted.<sup>9</sup> Total has committed to ensuring that Thailand's PTTEP will take over Total's operations, thereby ensuring that the junta can continue to misappropriate gas revenues.<sup>10</sup> The continued presence of Asian energy companies, such as PTTEP and South Korea's POSCO, will blunt the impact of sanctions unless measures are taken to prevent the companies from making payments to the junta.<sup>11</sup> Notably, as EU countries reduce their huge reliance on Russian gas and oil, Chevron and Total have spread disinformation, hindering sanctions, asserting that Thailand needs Burmese gas, when it makes up only 14% of Thailand's needs and could be replaced easily.<sup>12</sup>

Foreign exchange from SOEs is paid into MFTB correspondent accounts and remains outside Burma. **Despite their vital role in securing hard cash for the regime, both MICB and MFTB have escaped international sanctions.** This has allowed the junta to retain full access to the correspondent accounts with those two banks. In Apr 2021, Independent Economists for Myanmar (IEM) estimated that **freezing deposits linked to MFTB and MICB could reduce the military's influx of foreign currency by roughly USD 2 billion/year**—out of an estimated revenue of 2.5 billion.<sup>13</sup> Such a move would greatly reduce the regime's ability to fund itself, and impede actors not subject to international sanctions to continue sourcing gems and timber from Burma and making payments to MOGE.

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<sup>1</sup> BBC (updated 5 May 2022) What sanctions are being imposed on Russia over Ukraine invasion?

<sup>2</sup> Euractiv (5 May 2022) International donors conference in Warsaw raises \$6.5 billion for Ukraine; PIIE (updated 29 Apr 2022) Russia's war on Ukraine: A sanctions timeline

<sup>3</sup> BBC (5 May 2022) How reliant is the world on Russia for oil and gas?

<sup>4</sup> CNBC (4 May 2022) EU proposes gradual ban on Russian oil in sixth round of sanctions against Moscow

<sup>5</sup> Irrawaddy (10 Nov 2021) Myanmar Junta to Stage Gem Fair in December; Global New Light of Myanmar (23 Apr 2022) First day of 57th Myanmar Gems Emporium held in Nay Pyi Taw; Global New Light of Myanmar (23 Apr 2022) SAC Chairman Prime Minister Senior General Min Aung Hlaing attends opening of 57th Myanmar Gems Emporium

<sup>6</sup> Justice for Myanmar (11 Jan 2022) US companies imported nearly 1,600 tonnes of Myanmar teak, circumventing sanctions; Diplomat (Sep 1 2021) An Italian Job in Myanmar; Justice for Myanmar (24 Nov 2021) US Retailers Trading in Myanmar Gems, Despite Sanctions

<sup>7</sup> AP (16 Dec 2021) Myanmar public urges gas sanctions to stop military funding

<sup>8</sup> Human Rights Watch (24 Feb 2022) Myanmar: EU Needs to Enforce New Sanctions on Junta

<sup>9</sup> Mizzima (1 May 2022) NGO warns that Total Energies continues to fund Myanmar junta

<sup>10</sup> Reuters (27 Jan 2022) RPT Thailand's PTTEP seen taking over big Myanmar gas field as majors exit

<sup>11</sup> Nikkei Asia (17 Mar 2022) Asian majors keep Myanmar gas pumping despite EU sanctions

<sup>12</sup> EarthRights International (22 Sep 2021) Analysis: impacts of a disruption of Myanmar gas imports on Thailand's energy security

<sup>13</sup> Nikkei Asia (29 Apr 2022) Myanmar economists urge curbs on junta's hard currency access

**Singapore has long been a financial hub for the business activities of the Burma military** and its partners,<sup>14</sup> with Burma arms brokers typically using the city-state to facilitate payments between the military and international arms suppliers.<sup>15</sup> On 11 Jan, Justice for Myanmar reported that Singaporean banks United Overseas Bank (UOB), Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC), and DBS Bank were potentially helping the junta cash in on teak sales—despite international sanctions—by facilitating payments to MTE.<sup>16</sup> Similarly, state revenue for the Yetagun gas field is paid into an MFTB account at a Singapore branch of Malaysian bank CIMB.<sup>17</sup> It is therefore paramount to adopt sanctions to stop Singapore-based banks and companies from enabling the junta to secure weapons and foreign exchange.

**Burma needs action to tackle impunity, not symbolic gestures**

| Measure type          | Ukraine situation   | Burma situation   |
|-----------------------|---|---|
| <b>Accountability</b> | The ICC Prosecutor launched an investigation into the situation in Ukraine, supported by 42 States party to the Rome Statute. | None. In 2019, the ICC opened an investigation on the 2017 forced deportation of Rohingya, but there have been no moves to address atrocity crimes during the coup. |

ICC (accessed 8 May 2022) Ukraine, Situation in Ukraine - ICC-01/22

As of 3 May, the Russian invasion of Ukraine had resulted in 3,193 civilians killed. The actual figure is likely considerably higher.<sup>18</sup> Russian forces used indiscriminate weapons against densely-populated areas; and Amnesty and Human Rights Watch documented several instances of war crimes.<sup>19</sup> Although Ukraine is not party to the Rome Statute, it has formally accepted the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression on its territory. As early as 28 Feb, the ICC Prosecutor announced that he would seek authorization to open an investigation into the situation in Ukraine, before reporting that his office had opened it on 2 Mar. In Mar–Apr, 43 State parties referred the situation in Ukraine to the Court.<sup>20</sup>

**Prominent leaders have voiced support for accountability efforts.** On 8 Apr, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen promised that the EU would help hold perpetrators accountable: “My message to Ukrainian people: Those responsible for the atrocities will be brought to justice. Your fight is our fight.”<sup>21</sup> US President Joe Biden called for Vladimir Putin to be tried for war crimes,<sup>22</sup> and said on 12 Apr that the atrocities committed in Ukraine qualified as genocide.<sup>23</sup> On 15 Apr, French president Emmanuel Macron said “the Russian authorities must be held accountable.”<sup>24</sup>

**Several countries and international organizations are now actively contributing to the investigation.** France has sent forensic experts to collect evidence of war crimes and said it would share the findings with the ICC.<sup>25</sup> On 29 Apr, the UK announced that it would dispatch a team of war crimes specialists, including experts in conflict-related sexual violence,<sup>26</sup> and the Netherlands said it would send several dozen gendarmerie officers.<sup>27</sup> On 7 May, the World Health Organization (WHO) stated

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<sup>14</sup> Justice for Myanmar (17 Feb 2022) ASEAN governments and companies complicit in the Myanmar military’s atrocity crimes  
<sup>15</sup> Justice for Myanmar (7 Feb 2022) Military-linked companies procured USD millions in arms and military equipment; Justice for Myanmar (1 Mar 2022) Arms broker with links to Belarus, Russia and Germany supplied Myanmar junta since coup attempt  
<sup>16</sup> Justice for Myanmar (11 Jan 2022) US companies imported nearly 1,600 tonnes of Myanmar teak, circumventing sanctions  
<sup>17</sup> Justice for Myanmar (3 Apr 2022) Ukraine: Apparent War Crimes in Russia-Controlled Areas; Amnesty International (1 Apr 2022) Ukraine: Russia’s cruel siege warfare tactics unlawfully killing civilians – new testimony and investigation  
<sup>18</sup> UNHCR (5 May 2022) UKRAINE SITUATION FLASH UPDATE #11  
<sup>19</sup> Human Rights Watch (16 Dec 2021) Leaked documents show Min Aung Hlaing personally concerned over oil and gas payments  
<sup>20</sup> ICC (accessed 8 May 2022) Ukraine, Situation in Ukraine - ICC-01/22  
<sup>21</sup> Radio Free Europe (8 Apr 2022) ‘Your Fight Is Our Fight’: Von Der Leyen Assures Kyiv Of Support For Its EU Bid After Touring Bucha  
<sup>22</sup> Guardian (4 Apr 2022) Biden calls for Putin to face war crimes trial over civilian killings in Ukraine  
<sup>23</sup> CNN (12 Apr 2022) Biden calls atrocities in Ukraine a ‘genocide’ for the first time  
<sup>24</sup> Emmanuel Macron, via Twitter (15 Apr 2022) <https://twitter.com/EmmanuelMacron/status/1514742080949604364>  
<sup>25</sup> Reuters (13 Apr 2022) French forensic experts in Bucha to help Ukraine investigate possible war crimes  
<sup>26</sup> GOV.UK (29 Apr 2022) UK dispatches war crimes experts to help Ukraine with investigations  
<sup>27</sup> NL Times (29 Apr 2022) Netherlands sends officers to investigate war crimes in Ukraine

that it was gathering evidence for a possible war crimes investigation into attacks on healthcare facilities.<sup>28</sup> The EU also set up a joint investigation team with Ukraine to collect evidence.<sup>29</sup>

In short, the ICC was already considering the possibility of an investigation four days into the conflict, and is now spearheading a coordinated international effort backed by 43 countries to hold the Russian regime accountable. This is more action than Burma ever got in decades of civil war marked by widespread military atrocities. **As of 22 April, there had been at least 10,962 armed clashes and attacks in Burma under this regime. Junta forces had killed at least 2,166 civilians in systematic attacks against the population amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity.**<sup>30</sup>

Like Ukraine, Burma is not party to the Rome Statute. However, on 17 Jul 2021, the National Unity Government (NUG)—Burma’s legitimate civilian government—**submitted a declaration to the ICC accepting its jurisdiction.**<sup>31</sup> Despite being given the opportunity to finally tackle widespread military impunity and investigate the crimes committed by the regime, the ICC has chosen not to act on it. In the same vein, no country has backed the NUG’s declaration or referred the crimes committed by the regime to the ICC. Unfortunately, this is not the first time the international community has shown such a blatant lack of political will regarding Burma.

On 20 Sep 2017, French president Macron said that attacks on the Rohingya amounted to genocide.<sup>32</sup> On 21 Mar 2022, the Biden administration declared that the Burma military had committed genocide against the Muslim minority, with Secretary of State Blinken stating “the day will come when those responsible for these appalling acts will have to answer for them.”<sup>33</sup> Apart from these symbolic gestures, neither countries have taken steps to actually hold the Burma military accountable, leaving Rohingya activists no choice but to seek justice in foreign courts under the principle of universal jurisdiction.<sup>34</sup>

### Gross underfunding and regime hamper relief efforts in Burma

| Measure type                         | Ukraine situation   | Burma situation   |
|--------------------------------------|---|---|
| Humanitarian and economic assistance | As of 28 Apr 2022, at least USD 4.2 billion in primarily humanitarian grant funding had been sent to Ukraine, and USD 10.1 billion more had been pledged. | As of 12 Apr 2022, UN OCHA had secured USD 37.1 million in aid. |

Devex (28 Apr 2022) Funding tracker: Who’s sending aid to Ukraine?; OCHA (19 Apr 2022) Myanmar Humanitarian Update 17

The Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered the world’s largest human displacement crisis. As of 4 May, over 5.7 million refugees had fled the country and a further 7.7 million had been displaced internally, amounting to one third of the population.<sup>35</sup> The Western world responded swiftly, making colossal sums of money available to respond to the situation; while neighboring countries, who for years had decried the arrival of refugees from the Middle East and elsewhere, opened their doors wide for Ukrainians.

On 11 Mar, the US approved an USD 13.6 billion aid package to Ukraine that included USD 4 billion in humanitarian support and 1.8 billion to respond to the economic needs in Ukraine and neighboring countries.<sup>36</sup> On 28 Apr, US President Joe Biden said he had asked Congress for an additional USD 33 billion to support Ukraine through September, including 8.5 billion in economic aid.<sup>37</sup> On 23 Mar, the UK pledged to allocate GBP 400 million in humanitarian and development assistance to the country.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Al Jazeera (7 May 2022) WHO gathers evidence on possible war crimes in Ukraine

<sup>29</sup> EU Observer (13 Apr 2022) EU will support investigation into war crimes in Ukraine

<sup>30</sup> Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) (27 Apr 2022) Data export tool, available at: <https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/>; Human Rights Watch (31 Jul 2021); ALTSEAN-Burma (9 Feb 2022) COUP WATCH SPECIAL EDITION: A year of struggle in Burma

<sup>31</sup> Fortify Rights (19 Aug 2021) Myanmar’s Civilian Government Delegates Jurisdiction to International Criminal Court

<sup>32</sup> Times of Israel (20 Sep 2017) Macron says Rohingya crisis in Myanmar is ‘genocide’

<sup>33</sup> BBC (21 Mar 2022) Myanmar Rohingya violence is genocide, US says

<sup>34</sup> Trial International (12 Aug 2021) UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION CASE IN ARGENTINA: AN IMPORTANT DECISION FOR THE ROHINGYAS

<sup>35</sup> UNHCR (5 May 2022) UKRAINE SITUATION FLASH UPDATE #11

<sup>36</sup> CNN (15 Mar 2022) Here’s what’s in the \$13.6 billion Ukraine aid package; The Conversation (14 Mar 2022) US aid to Ukraine: \$13.6 billion approved following Russian bombardment marks sharp increase

<sup>37</sup> CNBC (28 Apr 2022) Biden asks Congress for \$33 billion to support Ukraine through September

<sup>38</sup> Politics (23 Mar 2022) Chancellor Rishi Sunak’s £220m assistance for Ukraine in spring statement – reaction from Bond, the UK network of NGOs

On 4 Apr, the EU enabled its member states to redirect nearly EUR 17 billion from European funds to assist Ukrainian refugees.<sup>39</sup> As of 5 May, the EU had mobilized EUR 4 billion in financial support. On 5 May, an international donors conference hosted by Poland and Sweden raised USD 6.5 billion.<sup>40</sup>

In Burma, the junta's violence has also had terrible consequences for the civilian population. According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), as of 2 May 2022 there were 590,100 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Burma and 40,700 refugees from Burma *who had been displaced after 1 Feb 2021*. In other words, as of that date, there were **at least 1.89 million displaced persons in Burma and just across its borders** in neighboring countries.<sup>41</sup> The **junta has consistently worked to prevent others from providing humanitarian aid** or healthcare to vulnerable populations, **arresting volunteers for assisting IDPs and targeting IDP camps and their populations** on numerous occasions.<sup>42</sup>

As a result of these actions, along with the junta's mishandling of the economy and responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, millions of people are living hand to mouth in intense insecurity. In December 2021, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said that 14.4 million people in Burma—26% of the population—would need humanitarian assistance in 2022, a 1,300% increase from its prediction for 2021.<sup>43</sup> While need is high nationwide, the severity of need is highest in border regions: according to OCHA, by December 2021 there were 526,000 IDPs in “extreme” need, across the southeast (southern Shan, Karenni, eastern Bago, Karen, Mon, and Tanintharyi), northwest (Chin and Sagaing), northeast (Kachin and Northern Shan), as well as in Magway and Rakhine.<sup>44</sup>

Despite the urgency of the situation, significant funding gaps continue to hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid. As of 12 Apr, **OCHA had managed to secure only 5% (USD 37.1 million) of the record USD 826 million it had requested in its 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan** to assist 6.2 million people in need within Burma. The agency warned that **continued underfunding of this magnitude will have life-threatening consequences for millions of people** in 2022.<sup>45</sup> In light of the desperate humanitarian situation in and outside the country, it is critical that foreign states and organizations unlock enough funds to assist vulnerable groups.

However, sole reliance on cooperation with the junta for the delivery of humanitarian aid would be misguided and inexpedient, and would exacerbate pre-existing vulnerabilities in Burma. The military has proven time and again that it is not a responsible steward of aid or any other assistance for the people of Burma. Its presence, even alongside foreign aid providers, is likely to frighten communities, and the junta is liable to use aid as a means to step up securitization and commission of atrocity crimes.<sup>46</sup>

It is notable that Adelina Kamal, former Executive Director of the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) Centre, is among the loudest voices calling for ASEAN, Burma's neighbors, the UN Special Envoy on Myanmar, and other international actors to support *humanitarian aid that goes through non-state actors* in Burma, such as community-based health organizations.<sup>47</sup>

The first step forward towards a sustainable solution to strengthen community resilience and significantly mitigate the crisis' destabilizing impacts on the ASEAN region, would be to restart and scale up border-based aid programs that were present on that Thai-Burmese border in the 1980s–2000s; and develop these on Burma's western border as well. It is imperative that the management and implementation of such efforts be organized with the inclusion of and implementation by community-based organizations that already have the trust and cooperation of affected communities on the ground.

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<sup>39</sup> European Council (4 Apr 2022) Ukraine: €17 billion of EU funds to help refugees

<sup>40</sup> Euractiv (5 May 2022) International donors conference in Warsaw raises \$6.5 billion for Ukraine

<sup>41</sup> UNHCR (4 May 2022) Myanmar emergency overview map: Number of people displaced since Feb 2021 and remain displaced (As of 2 May 2022)

<sup>42</sup> ALTSEAN-Burma (26 Apr 2022) DIRE HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY: The urgent need to address human security consequences of junta violence

<sup>43</sup> OCHA (Dec 2021) Myanmar Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022

<sup>44</sup> Irrawaddy (27 Dec 2021) Myanmar Regime Continues to Shell Karen State Border Town

<sup>45</sup> OCHA (19 Apr 2022) Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 17 | 19 April 2022

<sup>46</sup> Progressive Voice and FORUM-ASIA (2021) Great Expectations: Analysis of the ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management; Human Rights Foundation of Monland, Kachin Women's Association Thailand, Karen Human Rights Group, Karen Peace Support Network, Karen Women's Organization, Karenni Civil Society Network, Karenni National Women's Organization, Pa-O Women's Union, Progressive Voice, and Ta'ang Women's Organization (Sep 2021) Nowhere to Run: Deepening Humanitarian Crisis in Myanmar

<sup>47</sup> Fulcrum (16 Feb 2022) Myanmar Crisis: A Humanitarian Stalemate or Fresh Opportunities?